Abstract-We study the productivity of U.S. and other foreign-owned plants in the United Kingdom. Using a new data set that can identify for the first time domestic U.K. MNEs in such a study, we find that U.K. MNEs are less productive than U.S. affiliates, but as productive as non-U.S. foreign affiliates. Exploiting dynamic variation in our data, we find evidence suggesting that this additional U.S. advantage is due to the takeover of already highly productive U.K. plants rather than the sharing of superior firm-specific assets. The study also features a novel approach to TFP calculation.
I. Introduction

I NTERNATIONAL comparisons show that the United
States is the world's most productive economy 1 and much research has gone into understanding the determinants of this productivity leadership. 2 Responsible for this success could be the business environment in which U.S. firms operate and/or technological factors (such as superior technologies for designing products and production processes, and better management) specific to U.S. firms. While the latter might themselves be determined by the business environment, 3 the distinction between business environment and technological factors is interesting because of its implications for economic policy. A technological explanation for the U.S. lead, for example, could motivate policies to source this superior technological knowledge from abroad. 4 We examine these issues by looking at a firm-level data set that automatically rules out environmental factors since all firms in the sample are located in the same environment. Using data from the U.K. Office for National Statistics (ONS) that comprehensively covers the whole of U.K. manufacturing, we compare the productivity performance of U.S. multinationals in Britain with those of other multinational enterprises (MNE) and domestic firms. A number of existing studies have made similar comparisons for the United Kingdom. 5 These studies have found that on average U.S. firms in Britain are significantly more productive than their domestic counterparts, which seems consistent with the explanation of U.S. productivity leadership being based on technological factors. However, care should be taken in drawing such a conclusion from this evidence, for the following reasons.
Firstly, by definition, all foreign-owned establishments in any country, and thus all U.S.-owned establishments in Britain, must be part of an MNE. As has been suggested by Dunning (1981) , Helpman (1984) , Markusen (1995) , and more recently by Helpman et al. (2004) , MNEs can be expected to be at the upper end of the productivity distribution in any country because factors such as language barriers and ignorance of local business networks leave foreign firms at a disadvantage. If nevertheless MNE firms manage to stay in business, they must have superior firmspecific assets-such as better management techniques and better production technology-which can be shared with their foreign affiliates and which give them an edge over local competitors. In fact, even in the United States, foreignowned firms are found on average to be more productive than their domestic counterparts (Doms & Jensen, 1998) . To account for these aspects we therefore need to compare foreign-owned firms with domestic MNEs, and not to all domestic firms. Doms and Jensen (1998) did this in the case of the United States and found that foreign MNEs are less productive than U.S. MNEs in the United States. This type of comparison for the United Kingdom has not been possible up to now as the available data for the United Kingdom only included indicators for foreign ownership, but not the multinational status of domestic firms.
Secondly, while Doms and Jensen (1998) results are consistent with a U.S. technology lead, this does not rule out the possibility that the U.S. success is driven by a home advantage: U.S. MNEs enjoy a productivity advantage only in the United States, where they have a more intimate knowledge of local practices.
Finally, a major form of MNE entry into foreign markets is via takeovers of existing plants. This is likely not a random process. If U.S. MNEs systematically take over firms that were already more productive, then a U.S. advantage in the United Kingdom could emerge even without any transfer of superior knowledge or technology from the U.S. parent to its plant in the United Kingdom.
Our paper provides new results and progresses a number of issues. For the first time we are able to identify domestic MNEs in the productivity data set used in earlier U.K. studies by combining it with data from the U.K. Annual Survey into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI). This shows that U.K. MNEs are significantly more productive than domestic non-MNE firms. Using a wide range of different productivity measures and robustness checks we find, like Doms and Jensen, that U.S. MNEs are on average more productive than all other MNEs. This suggests that their finding was not driven by a home market effect.
Also we have annual plant-level panel data for 1996 to 2000. Using the longitudinal variation and changes in ownership of plants we examine whether this U.S. advantage is driven by plant picking effects rather than by knowledge or technology transfer from the parent firm. The results suggest that this is indeed the case. While we find a strong effect on productivity after takeover by an MNE, 6 these effects are not any stronger for takeovers by U.S. MNEs. We findusing two different identification strategies-that U.S. MNEs tend to take over plants that are already more productive prior to acquisition.
Finally, our data set allows us to examine the technology sourcing hypothesis (Branstetter, 2001; Keller, 2004) . According to this hypothesis FDI might not be driven by superior firms exploiting their advantage abroad (Dunning, 1981) , but rather by domestic firms trying to gain access to superior foreign technology. We can examine this by looking at the productivity performance of domestic firms that started to invest abroad during the sample period-that is, that became multinational in 1996-2000. Although we did not find significant evidence for such an effect, this might be due to the short panel available.
Our paper also makes a number of methodological contributions. Firstly, among the productivity measures we employ to examine the robustness of our results we use a new TFP (total factor productivity) estimator, derived from a structural production function estimation approach; that is, the estimator is similar to those proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) but addresses a number of shortcomings of these estimators. 7 Secondly, we propose two new frameworks that separately identify firm and plant effects. Both exploit the facts that we have plant-level data, we know which plants are under common firm ownership, and we have sufficient switches of ownership of plants between different firms. Our first framework posits a double fixed-effects model where the plant effect is the time-invariant component of a plant's productivity as it switches between firms and the firm effect is the time-invariant component as a firm owns different plants. Our second framework extends the structural productivity estimator we use for our robustness checks by explicitly including a multinomial selection model, which is simultaneously estimated with the production function equation. This framework allows flexible mapping of the relationship between pre-takeover performance and takeover. For example, we can easily examine whether an important determinant of takeover is the pre-takeover plant's short-term rather than long-term performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the data set. Section III outlines the econometric framework and the details of the two-step estimation procedure used to disentangle the U.S. productivity effect. Section IV reports the results and section V concludes.
II. The Data
A. Data Sources
Our sample is drawn from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD), 8 which is the U.K. equivalent of the U.S. Longitudinal Respondents Database (LRD). The data set was made available by the ONS and is based on information from the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI), a mandatory annual survey of U.K. businesses. 9 The ARD unit of observation is defined by the ONS as an autonomous business unit. We refer to this level of observation as a plant. 10 It is important to note that the ARD does not comprise the complete population of U.K. businesses. For example, businesses located in Northern Ireland are excluded; all other businesses with more than 100 employees 11 are surveyed, with smaller businesses being sampled randomly. Each year the sampled plants account for around 90% of total U.K. manufacturing employment. 12 The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel of about 19,000 manufacturing plants which we observe annually for the years 1996 to 2000.
The country of ownership of a foreign firm operating in the United Kingdom-and thus the ability to identify foreignowned MNE plants in the United Kingdom-is provided in the ARD. 13 While this identifies foreign-owned plants, it has 6 We refer to these as firm effects. 7 Stata code to implement the estimator can be downloaded from http://87.230.13.240/bin/view/CERIBA/TrueSpread. 8 More extensive descriptions of the ARD can be found in Criscuolo, Haskel, and Martin (2003) , Griffith (1999), and Oulton (1997) .
9 Annual Census of Production until 1998. 10 Some of these business units are spread across several sites and are therefore not plants in the strictest definition. About 80% of the business units are located at a single mailing address.
11 In some years the threshold was 250 employees; for details refer to Criscuolo, Haskel, and Martin (2003) . 12 To examine whether our results are sensitive to the oversampling of larger plants we ran regressions with inverse sampling probabilities as weights. These results, available upon request from the authors, are not qualitatively different from the unweighted results reported in the results section. 13 The ARD data are supplemented here with information from the Dun & Bradstreet global Who Owns Whom database. According to Dun & Bradstreet, the nationality of a plant is determined by the country of residence of the global ultimate parent, that is, the topmost company of a worldwide hierarchical relationship identified bottom-to-top using any company that owns more than 50% of the control (voting stock, ownership shares) of another business entity.
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not previously been possible to identify U.K. MNEs. To do this we use the AFDI register.
The AFDI is an annual survey of businesses that requests a detailed breakdown of the financial flows between U.K. firms and their overseas parents or subsidiaries; it operates at firm rather than plant level. The ONS maintains a register that provides the sampling frame for the AFDI and which holds information on the population of all U.K. firms that engage in or receive FDI, on the country of ownership of each foreign firm, and on which U.K. firms have foreign subsidiaries or branches and where these are located. 14 This register is designed to capture the universe of firms that are involved in FDI abroad and in the United Kingdom. We consequently define as multinational each plant in the ARD that is owned by a firm that appears in the AFDI register. 15 One problem with the AFDI register is that information is not always up to date. If a firm engages in or receives FDI, it will only be included in the AFDI register after the ONS learns about this from external sources, including commercial data and newspapers. Consequently, the register population has varied, somewhat spuriously, over the years with the ONS's success in identifying such firms. However, we believe that this problem does not weaken the conclusions that can be drawn from our results. If some of the plants recorded as non-multinational were actually part of an MNE, the estimated productivity gap would be a lower bound of that found using data free from measurement errors. Table 1 shows the number of multinational plants that we can identify in the population and in the sample and their relevance in terms of employment and value added.
B. Descriptive Evidence
Column 1 reports the number of domestic plants with no FDI (defined as U.K. non-MNEs), British MNEs (U.K. MNE), U.S. MNEs (U.S.), and non-U.S. foreign-owned plants (FOR) in the whole population. Column 2 shows the number of plants in each group for the sample surveyed by the ONS to compile the ARD. Columns 3 and 4 translate these numbers into shares. Column 3 shows that 1% of all plants in Britain are U.S. owned, as big a percentage almost as all other foreign-owned plants combined. Indeed, U.S. MNEs represent more than 40% of all foreign-owned plants in Britain (615/(615 ϩ 825)). Figures are similar for shares in employment (column 5) and value added (column 7), where U.S.-owned plants represent 47% and 51% of FDI, respectively. These figures are consistent with the fact that the most productive companies are also likely to have the highest market share. Also, since U.S. MNEs are on average larger, the relative share of U.S. MNEs in the selected sample is much higher: whereas in the total population U.S. MNEs take a share of about 1%, in the sample the same figure rises to 5%. Table 2 reports averages and standard deviations for relevant variables. Panel 1 shows the U.S.-owned plants' labor productivity lead: averaging over the whole manufacturing sector and not controlling for industry we find that plants owned by U.S. firms have an advantage of 26% ((46.57 Ϫ 36.87 )/36.87) over British MNEs and an advantage of 8% ((46.57 Ϫ 43.10)/43.10) over other foreign MNEs. In terms of gross output per employee (panel 2) the ranking changes: foreign non-U.S.-owned plants are the most productive and, in general, the foreign advantage becomes more dramatic. Panels 3 and 4 suggest that the figures in panel 2 can be explained in part by the fact that non-US foreign-owned plants have much higher materialsto-labor and capital-to-labor ratios than all other plants. Panel 5 shows that U.S. plants are on average larger and pay higher wages. This might imply that at least part of the U.S.
14 The working definition of FDI for this purpose is that the investment must give the investing firm a significant level of control over the recipient firm. The ONS considers this to be the case if the investment gives the investor a share of at least 10% of the recipient firm's capital. The ONS further distinguishes between subsidiaries and branches as follows: a subsidiary is a company where the parent company holds more than 50% of the equity share capital; a branch is a permanent establishment as defined for U.K. corporation tax and double taxation relief purposes; companies where the investing company holds between 10% and 50% of the equity share capital, that is, does not have a controlling interest, but participates in the management, are defined as associates. The country of ownership is identified by the nationality of the immediate owner (Office for National Statistics, 2002, p. 120) .
15 Details of the procedure followed to merge the AFDI and the ARD are reported in . advantage is due to scale effects 16 and employment of higher-skilled workers. Thus, the U.S. advantage might not be based on technological or managerial superiority but simply on different input choices. Table 2 shows that both U.S. and foreign MNEs have much higher capital intensity than U.K.-owned plants. This suggests that part of the observed foreign-ownership advantage could be driven by this higher capital intensity. To examine this we need to estimate total factor productivity (TFP). The literature has suggested different approaches for estimating plant-level TFP.
III. The Framework
A. A Simple Framework
The most common approach is to assume that firms produce according to a Cobb-Douglas production technology:
where q it is the logarithm of output produced at plant i in period t, ␥ is the returns to scale coefficient, Z is a set of production factors-labor (L), physical capital (K), and intermediate inputs (M), all expressed in logs-␣ z are the production function parameters, and a it is TFP. With the data available we can start by examining whether TFP varies systematically between multinationally owned and domestic plants by running an OLS estimation of the following equation:
That is, we regress deflated revenue, r it Ϫ p It , 17 per worker, x Lit , on inputs, ownership dummies 18 interacted dummies, It , to control for four digit sectors time effects and ten regional dummies R to control for location effects within Britain. 19 This approach-although standard practice-raises a number of concerns. Firstly, OLS will be inconsistent if the plant's factor input choices are determined by TFP as is likely to be the case. Secondly, since we only observe sectoral prices and not plant-level prices, deflated revenue, which forms the LHS variable in equation (2), corresponds to output quantities Q in equation (1) only under perfect competition. Thirdly, the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function is very restrictive.
Our main tool to account for these issues is a modified version of the framework suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) , which is new to the literature.
B. A More Flexible Approach
To overcome the limitations outlined above using the data we have, we start with an approach originally introduced by Klette and Griliches (1996) and Klette (1999) to integrate a more flexible production function into a setting of imperfect competition.
We assume that firms produce according to a homogeneous of degree ␥ general differentiable function f (⅐): 16 Here we refer to scale effects at plant level. In our study we cannot control for the scale of the global operations of MNEs, for example, we do not have information on global employment. 17 At plant level we observe nominal sales r it ϭ q it ϩ p it but since we do not have plant-level information on prices, we deflated nominal sales using (four-digit) sector-level price deflators p It .
18 U.S. J(i,t) , for example, would be equal to 1 if plant i is owned in period t by U.S. firm J. 19 In our results section we further break down the other foreign and MNE categories to account for possible heterogeneity within those groups. In particular, we distinguish between E.U.-owned multinationals and non-E.U.-owned multinationals because E.U. MNEs are more likely to operate under the same regulatory environment and to make sure that the U.S. effect does not merely reflect a non-E.U. effect. We then want to isolate U.K. multinationals that are as comparable as possible to U.S. affiliates. One way of doing this is to separate out from the U.K. multinationals group those U.K. MNEs that invest in the United States. 
where X it is a vector of factor inputs. Also, using the data available, we can only observe nominal revenues-quantity times price in logs q it ϩ p itdeflated using (four-digit) sector-level price deflators p It since plant-level prices are not observed; that is,
To control for unobserved plant-level prices we specify a demand function that links prices to output as follows (see also Melitz, 2000) :
where subscripts i denote firm and I industry; ⌳ it is a firm-specific demand shock, is industry demand elasticity, and ⍜ It is a sectoral shock to demand. 20 Taking the logs of equation (5) and inverting gives
where
is the markup of price over marginal cost implied by profit maximizing behavior and lowercase letters denote logarithms. Combining equations (6) and (1) with (4) gives 21
where it ϭ 1 (a it ϩ it ).
Klette showed that using the mean value theorem we can write the production function relative to the median firm as
where small letters with a tilde denote log deviations from the median plant (ᏹ) in a given year, 22 and ␣ z represents the partial derivative of the log production function evaluated at some point X it in the convex hull spanned by X it and X ᏹt , so that
where f z (⅐) represents the partial derivative of f(⅐) with respect to production factor z. The first-order condition of profit maximization implies that
that is, prices are such that the marginal value product is the markup times the marginal cost W of each factor. As pointed out by Klette (1999) , equation (10) can only be expected to hold for production factors that are easily adjustable. We assume that this is the case for intermediates and labor, but not for capital, thus:
where S zit is the revenue share of factor z and z ʦ {L, M}. Further, because of the homogeneity of degree ␥ of the production function we get
and therefore in equation (8),
is an index of all variable factors. These results allow us to rewrite equation (7) as 23
The variable factor index vĩ it can be directly observed from the data, since it only requires information on factor inputs and their revenue shares. 24 Equation (15) suggests that the final element required to derive an estimate for it is an estimate of ␤ K ϭ ␥ , the ratio between the scale and the markup coefficients. But plantlevel capital stocks-like all other inputs-are presumably 20 This demand function can be derived by assuming monopolistic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz (see Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977) in the product market. 21 As stressed by Klette and Griliches (1996) , the interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the production factors is different from that in equation (1) as they are now all divided by the markup coefficient .
22 For example, q it ϭ lnQ it Ϫ lnQ Mt . 23 All aggregate expressions such as p It and It in equation (7) disappear because the equation is now written in terms of deviations from the median plant in the sector.
24 Equation (9) suggests that we should evaluate the derivatives-and thus the factor shares-at some point in the convex hull. Since we do not know the exact location of this point and of course we do not know the functional form of the derivative, we follow accepted practice and approximate by averaging over the factor share at plant i and the factor share at the median plant ᏹ to calculate the shares in i it ; that is,
See also Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) on this.
highly correlated with it ; 25 we address this problem using a modified version of the Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) approach and assume that it evolves as a first-order Markov process:
We also assume that capital is only correlated with the expected component of it but not with it . 26 Then we can estimate equation (15) if we find a control for E{ it ͉ itϪ1 }.
In appendix B we show that conditional on capital and assuming that markups are constant across firms in a narrowly defined sector (four-digit) there is a monotone relationship between profits-defined as revenues minus variable costs-and . Consequently we can invert the profit function and write
We do not know the functional form of E{ it ͉⅐}, but we express it as a function of observables in equation (17) so that we can rewrite equation (15) as
where g(⅐)ϭE{ it ͉(⅐)} is a function of unknown form. To estimate equation (18) we can either employ a semiparametric procedure or approximate g(⅐) by a third-order polynomial. For simplicity, we adopt the latter strategy. An estimator for it can then be derived as
Concerning the method used to correct for endogeneity of factor inputs we would like to stress that compared with Olley and Pakes (1996) the main innovation in our approach is to use profits and not investment as a predictor for it . This has a number of advantages. Firstly, a major criticism of the OP framework is that investment might be a very poor predictor of the fixed component of it . 27 If firms are essentially in a steady state-and the capital stock in period t reflects the firm's knowledge about it at t Ϫ1-then the variation in investment primarily reflects adjustments to news about from period t. Our approach-similar to Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) who use material inputs rather than investment-does not suffer from this problem. Plants with high will have higher profits regardless of whether they are in steady state. Secondly, and unlike Levinsohn and Petrin, we can identify all relevant parameters from a moment condition on capital without having to assume separability in intermediate inputs or to rely on instrumental variable techniques. Also, we do not require any assumptions about substitutability between variable production factors. 28 Finally, to examine whether measured TFP ( it ) systematically differs between various types of MNEs we run a regression of it from equation (19) on our ownership dummies.
(20)
How do we interpret TFP, here denoted as it (and it )? Without plant-level price information it is no longer possible to regard TFP as a shift parameter relating solely to technical efficiency. 29 Rather, it ϭ 1 (a it ϩ it ) is a composite of technology shocks a it , demand shocks it , and markup . How does this affect the way we interpret the MNE, US, and FOR dummies in equation (20)? If we assume that within four-digit sectors is constant, a higher it for U.S. and MNE plants reflects higher product quality and/or consumer valuation it , and/or higher technical efficiency, a it . However, if is not constant within four-digit sectors, then a higher it might reflect greater market power, as recent papers 30 have demonstrated. This implies that revenue-based measures of TFP ( it ) might vary between plants for reasons other than product quality and technical efficiency. If within-sector differences in market power are positively related to the composite of technical efficiency and product quality (a it ϩ it ), then revenue-based TFP provides a downward-biased estimate of "real" TFP. 31 Foster et al. (2003) 32 find a positive relationship between market power and product quality, ( it ) here. If this is the case the MNE advantage estimated under the assumption of constant markups within sectors is a downward-biased estimate of the "true" advantage that exists in the presence of within-sector differences in markup. 33 Since we do not have firm-level prices, in order to ensure that our results are not driven by multinationals having 25 See Griliches and Mairesse (1995) for a summary of the endogeneity problem and potential solutions. 26 Olley and Pakes assume that investment in t can only be used for production in t ϩ 1. We take a different assumption, that is, that investment is predetermined. Although this would be problematic in the Olley and Pakes methodology, it does not affect our estimation procedure.
27 See Griliches and Mairesse (1995) . 28 For a more detailed discussion of our approach see Martin (2003) . 29 Melitz (2000) stresses this point. 30 See, for example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2003) , Syverson (2004) , and Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2003) . 31 If in equation (7) the coefficients on factor inputs vary because of differences in market power across plants ( it ) but our estimation model uses fixed coefficients t ʦ [min{ it }; max{ it }] and Cov ( it , a it ϩ it ) Ͼ 0, then for plants with high (a it ϩ it ) we attribute too much output variation to production factors. More intuitively, this is the case because our regression model does not control for the fact that for plants with larger it an increase in factors would lower prices relatively more. 32 One of the few productivity studies to use a data set with firm-level prices. 33 The reason for this result is that the assumption of constant markup leads to TFP estimates for better plants, such as MNEs, which are downward biased. greater market power than domestic firms we did two checks.
First, we devised a test-based on overidentifying restrictions-of the assumption that in equation (7) is constant. 34 The hypothesis that is constant is rejected in a large number of sectors. We estimated our preferred specification only on plants in those sectors where we cannot reject the null of a constant . The estimates show the same productivity ranking for MNEs as found in the whole sample.
Second, we tried to identify sectors where market power might be less likely to drive the rankings. We assume that in commodity producing sectors 35 the assumption of constant markup within four-digit industries is more likely to hold than in noncommodity sectors where multinationals might have more market power, for example because of stronger brands, and therefore might be able to command higher prices.
An alternative, and possibly the simplest, way to handle the endogeneity problem in production function estimations is to follow a factor share approach, which involves no regression analysis at all but requires the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale to hold. 36 Following Baily et al. (1992) and adopting a similar strategy to that used to calculate the variable factor index i it in the previous subsection, 37 we calculate TFP as
and check the robustness of our results to using this measure of TFP as left-hand-side variable.
C. Explaining the Sources of the U.S. and MNE Productivity Advantage
In this section we develop two different strategies to separately identify plant and firm contributions to plant productivity. As discussed in the introduction, the higher productivity of a plant owned by an MNE could be attributed to different factors.
Firstly, the parent firm might possess some superior knowledge and other transferable assets that improve the performance of its subsidiaries (best firm effect). 38 Examples include international distribution networks, special management techniques, patents, blueprints, and reputation effects.
Secondly, MNE firms might be better at picking plants with superior performance (plant picking effect); for example, multinational firms might be able to take over the best plants because of deeper pockets to finance their takeover activities or higher ability to spot top-performing plants.
A third reason for higher MNE plant productivity is the going global effect: plants owned by firms that start investing abroad might experience productivity improvements as a direct consequence of FDI because of firm-level scale economies, cheaper options to hedge against exchange rate risk, technology sourcing from abroad, or other learning effects.
A double fixed-effect approach. We first distinguish between these various effects using a double fixed-effects approach. Thus we write productivity of plant i at time t, it , as 39
That is, productivity can be decomposed into an effect t,J (i,t) due to the parent firm of plant i at time t and a plant-specific effect ␣ i . 40 The parent firm effect t,J(i,t) is then decomposed further in a time-invariant firm-specific effect J(i,t) and a time-varying effect that captures the productivity effects from becoming a multinational, ␤ MNE ; that is,
so that
How do we identify and estimate the different determinants of the multinational advantage in this setting? The best firm effect implies that MNE firms-both foreign and Britishhave a higher firm-specific fixed effect:
where MNE firms is the set of firms in our sample that are multinational at some point during our sample period. Similarly, to investigate the presence of a plant picking effect we test that plant-specific fixed effects are higher for plants that are owned by MNEs; that is: 34 The details of this test are reported in appendix C. 35 We identify these using Rauch (1999) classification. 36 An alternative method to estimate TFP controlling for the endogeneity of inputs would be difference GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and system GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998) . We applied these estimation methods to our sample, but encountered two problems: first the time period of our sample, five years, is too short, and less than 7% of the plants are observed over the whole time period; secondly, because the ARD surveys small plants randomly, there is continuous time series information for only 12% of the plants. 37 This approach is equivalent to imposing ␥ ϭ 1, which rules out imperfect competition and nonconstant returns to scale. 38 We can think of this effect as the ownership-specific factors in Dunning's (1981) explanation of FDI or the knowledge capital of the firm in Markusen (1995) . 39 For simplicity at this stage we do not separate the MNE group further into U.S. and other foreign (FOR). We reintroduce these in the empirical analysis below. Also, in the empirical implementation we use an estimate of it the residual from equation (2) as reported in column 5 of table 3. 40 For simplicity of exposition we abstract from differences between types of MNEs.
where MNEplants is the set of plants that are owned by an MNE at some point during the sample period. Finally, the going global effect is represented as ␤ MNE Ͼ 0.
To separately identify these different effects we use changes in ownership status over the course of our sample period. For the identification of the going global effect we look at U.K. domestic firms that start investing abroad-that is, become MNEs-during our sample period. For identifying the best firm and plant picking effects we look at the performance of plants as they change ownership between MNE and non-MNE firms. Figure D1 in appendix D illustrates the identification strategy using an example. Table D1 in appendix D presents evidence that reassures us that our data have sufficient transitions of firms between multinational states, and of plants between different types of firms.
The estimation of these effects proceeds in two steps. The first step is a productivity regression where we control for every firm-plant combination fixed effect so that in equation (24) this will cancel out both the firm-and plant-specific fixed components, ␣ i and J (i,t) .
where a tilde represents the fixed effects within transformation. 41 If endogenous selection into the multinational group is entirely driven by the firm-and plant-specific fixed effects-an assumption we relax in our second approach below-then a regression of equation (27) provides a consistent estimate of the causal productivity impact of being an MNE; that is, a positive going global effect would imply ␤ MNE Ͼ 0. With an unbiased estimate of ␤ MNE we can estimate the firm-plant combination fixed effects:
This provides the basis for our second-stage regression where we regress the predicted fixed effects on two dummy variables, MNE J ever and MNE i ever . MNE J ever is equal to 1 for firms that are MNEs at any point during the sample. Similarly, MNE i ever is equal to 1 for plants that are owned by MNEs in any year in the sample period. Formally, the second stage is
The plant picking effect is ␤ i ever Ͼ 0 and the best firm effect ␤ J ever Ͼ 0. What are the potential concerns in this analysis? A strong assumption in our identification strategy is that all unobserved heterogeneity can be captured by our two fixed effects. There might be important deviations from this assumption. In particular we are concerned that takeover by an MNE is likely correlated with time-varying shocks, as well as plant fixed effects. For example, the transition to foreign ownership might depend not only on a plant's fixed characteristics, but also on its time-varying characteristics and idiosyncratic shocks. These might make plants more likely to be taken over because they are temporarily weak and thus an easy target for a hostile foreign takeover, or because MNEs become interested in a particular plant only after a positive productivity shock, which might reveal better future growth potential. In the next section we describe a possible estimation strategy that allows us to correct for this source of endogeneity.
Correcting for endogeneity of becoming a multinational. In this section we develop an econometric framework that controls for endogeneity in the probability of becoming part of an MNE, 42 incorporating the effects of MNE ownership and takeover selection effects into the structural productivity estimation framework described in section III B. 43 We incorporate takeover selection by explicitly integrating a choice model as a step in the estimation. The plant picking effect is then measured by the extent to which productivity prior to takeover influences the occurrence of an MNE takeover. 44 To describe our framework we start by only considering two ownership states for notational simplicity: whether a plant is owned by an MNE. 45 Also, we follow the control function approach described in the previous section and assume that can be decomposed as
where evolves as follows: it ϭg( itϪ1 )ϩv it . If MNE ownership is correlated with it , we have to include ownership status as an additional variable together with net revenue and physical capital in the control function:
Secondly, if firms systematically select plants they take over this likely influences expectations about plant-level s. Hence, in the second stage of the OP-style procedure we get
41 That is,
that returns the number of periods plant i is owned by the firm J(i,t).
42 Of course, the ideal setup to examine firm effects would be a randomized sample of plant takeovers by the different types of MNEs. Such data are not available. 43 This implies that we control for endogeneity, and plant-level shocks can evolve as a general Markov process. 44 For simplicity we start by looking at productivity in the year immediately prior to the takeover; we then extend the model to allow longer lags to influence the takeover choice. 45 The framework immediately extends to the more general case of multiple ownership states, which we use in our actual implementation.
where in the last equation we use the fact that E itϪ1 {MNE J(it) }ϭP itϪ1 ; that is, that the expectation at t Ϫ 1 of being an MNE at time t is the probability of becoming an MNE in the next period. 46 We then get an estimate of P itϪ1 by running a discretechoice model of becoming an MNE on a set of explanatory variables for each time t:
The MNE dummy captures that MNE ownership in the current period is likely to increase the probability of MNE ownership in the next period. 47 The takeover decision is also likely influenced by other factors such as the size of the capital stock-since larger plants with more valuable assets might, all else being equal, be more interesting takeover candidates-and by longer lags of it . 48 Of course is not directly observable, but as before it can be controlled for by capital and net revenue. The estimation proceeds as follows: we first run a logit 49 of the probability of becoming part of an MNE (that is, MNE takeover) on capital, net revenue, and ownership status:
where P (⅐) is a general function approximated by a polynomial. We then estimate the following equation:
where (⅐) is again approximated by a polynomial to smooth out it . Note that
Using the assumption of a Markov process in it we can obtain an estimate for ␤ k and ␤ from a nonlinear least squares regression of
which from equation (37) immediately gives us an estimator of . This allows us finally to estimate equation (34):
In this setting the value of ␤ gives us an estimate of the best firm effect and MNE provides an estimate of the plant picking effect. 50
IV. Results
A. Evidence of the MNE and U.S. Productivity Advantage
The labor productivity advantage of multinationals, U.S. and non-U.S., reported in row 1 of table 2 might reflect the fact that MNEs tend to operate in highly productive industries and/or tend to cluster in particular regions with special geographical advantages. In fact, figure 1 shows that MNEs are more present in medium-to high-technology sectors such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals; paper; electrical equipment; and optical equipment.
Thus, we start our econometric analysis by controlling for interacted four-digit industry time fixed effects and regional dummies. The results of this exercise are reported in column 1 of table 3, where we regress labor productivity, measured as real value added per employee on four-digit industry year dummy interactions, ten regional dummies, and two ownership dummies: US, which equals 1 when a plant is a subsidiary of a U.S. multinational, and FOR, which takes the value 1 when a plant is owned by a foreign, non-U.S., corporation.
We find that U.S. and other foreign-owned plants are on average 42% and 30% respectively more productive than British domestic plants. 51 This sizable advantage is in line with previous results for Great Britain (for example, Oulton, 2000) . But how much of this advantage is due to these plants being part of a multinational enterprise? Column 2 contains the answers to this question by including a multinational dummy MNE that is 1 whenever a plant is owned by a multinational firm. If this multinational is U.S. owned the dummy US will be 1 as well. Consequently, in column 2 the US coefficient measures the advantage of U.S. MNEs 46 If this probability is affected by itϪ1 then identifying the parameters of g( itϪ1 ) as opposed to those of ␤ MNE and E itϪ1 {MNE J(it) ͉P itϪ1 } might not be straightforward. However, since in stage 2 we only need to identify the capital coefficient of the production function we introduce a combined function; that is, E tϪ1 { it } ϭ g( itϪ1 , P itϪ1 ) ϩ v it . 47 We report results that take into account average plant performance before takeover as well as current performance. For notational simplicity in this section we only include current performance. 48 This could be particularly important if there are information asymmetries between plants and MNE firms and MNEs learn about plants by observing them over several periods. 49 In our actual results we have different MNE states. Therefore we estimate a multinomial logit model. A more general approach would be to use a multinomial probit. However this would lead to computational intractabilities (Hajivassiliou & Ruud, 1993) . While this can be addressed by employing a simulation-based inference approach, this was beyond the scope of the current paper. 50 Since we have different types of MNEs, U.K., other foreign and U.S., in practice we use a multinomial choice model allowing for three states: U.S. MNE, other MNE (including U.K.), and becoming U.K. MNE. To distinguish the going global (becoming U.K. MNE) from the MNE takeover effect-as in the fixed-effects case-we include an "ever MNE" as well as a current MNE dummy variable, both defined at firm level. Since the results of the double fixed-effects approach show no indication of strong going global effects, we do not account for them in our second approach to avoid making it too complex a framework. 51 The percentage differences reported in the text are calculated from the coefficients of the dummy variables in table 3 according to the formula diff ϭ (e ␤dummy Ϫ 1); for example, for the United States 0.42 ϭ (e 0.349 Ϫ 1).
over British MNEs and the FOR coefficient represents the advantage of non-U.S. foreign-owned subsidiaries over British MNEs. 52 The coefficients' estimates reported in column 2 show that MNEs enjoy a productivity advantage of 30%, the United State has a significant additional advantage of 15%, while non-U.S. foreign-owned plants enjoy a smaller but significant 5% advantage relative to their British counterparts. Table 2 shows that both U.S. and foreign MNEs have much higher capital intensity than U.K. firms. This suggests that part of the observed foreign-ownership advantage could be driven by this higher capital intensity. To examine this we need to estimate TFP. We start with the simple OLS approach summarized in equation (2).
In column 3-besides capital and material intensity and regional and industry time effects-we only include U.S. and non-U.S. foreign-ownership dummies and find that U.S.-owned plants are significantly the most productive plants in Britain, enjoying a strong and significant TFP advantage of almost 8% (with a coefficient of 7.6 as shown by row 1 of column 3), and non-U.S. foreign-owned plants follow with an advantage of 4% relative to the reference group of all British plants. This confirms previous results (Griffith, 1999; Oulton, 2000; and Harris, 1999) . Column 4 shows that once we include a separate dummy for being part of an MNE, the advantage of non-U.S. foreign MNEs drops to an insignificant 1%. U.S. plants maintain a significant advantage of 4.5% relative to British MNEs, which, in turn, are 4.8% more productive than non-MNE plants. This result shows that only a part of the U.S. productivity advantage is actually a multinational effect. Column 5 accounts for age effects by including a quadratic polynomial in age 53 to account for possible differences due to the plant life cycle, learning effects, and/or the age of physical assets. The coefficient on U.S. MNE remains virtually unchanged, while the foreign non-U.S. advantage relative to U.K. MNEs is a nonsignificant 1%. Finally, MNEs are on average 4.6% more productive than British non-MNEs.
The aggregation of all non-U.S. foreign-owned plants in one group might hide considerable heterogeneity. Therefore, in column 6 of table 3, we control for a possible E.U. effect and reclassify the MNE groups in E.U. (excluding U.K. MNEs) versus non-E.U. MNEs. 54 We find that there is no statistically significant difference between the U.K. and E.U. MNE coefficients, while non-E.U. MNEs are significantly more productive than E.U. MNEs. What is driving this difference? Column 7 shows that once we separate U.S. MNEs from the non-E.U. MNE group, these are as before the productivity leaders followed by all other MNEs. In column 8 we report an additional robustness check for alternative definitions of multinationals. We distinguish 52 The performance of U.S. MNEs relative to domestic plants can, therefore, be calculated as the sum of the coefficients on MNE and US and the advantage of other foreign-owned plants as the sum of the coefficients on MNE and FOR. 53 Since our age variable is left censored in 1980, we include an age censoring dummy. We have tried alternative specifications for the age effect. We also experimented by including age categories and the logarithm of age, which leads to the same conclusions obtained under the current specification.
54 Details of the new country group classification can be found in appendix A.
FIGURE 1.-SHARE OF MNE PLANTS BY TWO-DIGIT SECTORS
Notes: The sectors reported are at the two-digit SIC92 level. 15 food and beverages; 17 textile; 18 wearing apparel; 19 leather; 20 wood and wood products; 21 pulp, paper, and paper products; 22 publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media; 24 chemicals and chemical products; 25 rubber and plastic products; 26 other nonmetallic mineral products; 27 basic metals; 28 fabricated metals; 29 machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (nec); 30 office machinery and computers; 31 electrical machinery and apparatus (nec); 32 radio, television, and communication equipment and apparatus; 33 medical, precision, and optical instruments, watches and clocks; 34 motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; 35 other transport equipment; 36 furniture, manufacturing (nec); 37 recycling. The figure reports shares of plants in each of the two-digit sectors owned by U.K., U.S., and other foreign MNEs.
from the group of U.K. MNEs those that have affiliates in the United States. The rationale is that these multinationals are likely more similar to U.S. MNEs; 55 in fact, when checking the incidence of this group of U.K. MNEs we find that in our sample 77% of U.K. MNEs have an affiliate in the United States. The results show that U.S. MNEs are still the productivity leaders and that U.K. MNEs that have affiliates in the United States are as productive as other foreign MNEs and more productive than the 23% of U.K. MNEs that do not have affiliates in the United States.
Our results thus suggest the following. Firstly, controlling for capital intensity, material usage, scale, and age effects, U.S. MNEs are the productivity leaders, with British and non-U.S. foreign MNEs having a comparable productivity advantage with respect to British plants that are not part of an MNE. Secondly, much of the U.S. and all of the non-U.S. foreign productivity advantage found in previous studies appears to be an MNE effect.
A. Robustness Checks
Several issues arise when estimating equation (2). Most of those we discussed already in section III B: factor inputs might be endogenous and the production technology might be more complex than Cobb-Douglas. Further, the regressions in table 3 impose the same production technology for the whole manufacturing sector. Finally, the assumption of perfect competition might not hold and the degree of market power might vary between the different groups of MNE and non-MNE firms within four-digit sectors. We examine the robustness of our results to all of these concerns using a number of different TFP estimation approaches, and also restricting the estimation to different subsamples of our data. The results reported in table 4 show that our main findings that MNEs are more productive than non-MNE plants, and that U.S. MNE plants are the productivity leaders, are qualitatively robust to addressing all of these concerns. We now discuss the individual columns in table 4. Column 1 presents a factor share-based TFP measure as discussed in section III B. As shown in equation (21) TFP is computed relative to the four-digit sector median plant, and factor shares are the average of the factor shares of the median plant and plant i. This implies that we impose a very flexible functional form production function, and production technology is allowed to vary between four-digit sectors. This TFP estimator is also robust to concerns over endogeneity of production factors. The productivity ranking of different MNE types is not affected and the resulting point estimates are similar to those in table 3. Column 2 presents the results for the structural production function estimator introduced in section III B. Relative to column 1 this relaxes the assumption of perfect competition. Again the productivity ranking remains the same. A number of things are worth pointing out here. Firstly, we now get an estimate for the ratio of scale to markup parameter ␥ . 56 As we allow production technology and this parameter to vary 55 Since both groups of firms operate in the United Kingdom and the United States. Ideally, one should compare MNEs that invest in the same set of third countries. However, the data do not contain information on FDI destinations other than the United Kingdom, for foreign-owned MNEs.
56 See equation (15). Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by establishment, that is, robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is log real value added (at factor cost) per employee. In columns 3 to 8 the dependent variable is the plant's real gross output per employee. Both value-added and gross output are deflated by four-digit annual output price deflators. Regressions in columns 5 to 8 include a quadratic polynomial in age and an age censoring dummy that equals 1 if the plant has existed since 1980. All regressions (columns 1 to 8) include region and four-digit industry time interaction dummies. US equals 1 if a plant is owned by a U.S. multinational, MNE is 1 for all plants that are part of MNE firms, and FOR is 1 for all plants owned by non-U.S. foreign multinationals. EU (non-EU) describes plants that are owned by E.U. (non-E.U.) MNEs; Out US is 1 for U.K. MNEs that have affiliates in the United States. Details of the country group classifications are in appendix A. *significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. **significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. ***significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.
at the four-digit sectoral level, the value reported in the table is actually the average across all sectors, weighted by the number of observations in each sector. The parameter estimate, 0.816, is smaller than 1, 57 which is consistent with imperfect competition. Secondly, while the productivity ranking is unchanged, the point estimates for both MNE and U.S. MNE effects are now much larger than in column 1. This is because under imperfect competition the factor share-based TFP estimator implicitly estimates ( ␥ Ϫ1) k it rather than TFP (a it ) or the composite shock ( it ). Thus, k it is positively correlated with and ( ␥ ) Ͻ 1 so that ( ␥ Ϫ1) Ͻ 0. Measured TFP of the more productive firms with larger capital stocks is too small. 58 Columns 3 and 4 primarily deal with the concern that market power might vary not only across different four-digit sectors, but also between different firms in the same four-digit sector. In column 3 we restrict the sample to plants in those sectors where the Sargan test described in appendix C cannot reject that is constant. In column 4 we restrict the sample to commodity producing sectors following Rauch's (1999) goods classification. 59 The suggestion is that in those sectors price differentiation is less of an issue. Column 5 allows for separate ␥ parameters for each group of MNE plants in each four-digit sector. 60 Thus column 5 also addresses the concern that results might be driven by MNEs being active in very different sectors of the economy. As shown by the estimates this is not the case. Also note that the average values for ␥ for different MNE types reported in rows 4 to 7 of column 5 suggest that there are no significant differences in this parameter across MNE groups. Again the productivity ranking remains qualitatively unchanged. In column 6 we address the issue of within four-digit sector plant heterogeneity by restricting the regression sample to those plants that are more similar to U.S. MNEs according to a range of characteristics including labor and material shares, size, and age. 61 This again leads to the same qualitative results. To summarize, the results shown in table 3 seem to be robust. In the next section we shed more light on the factors that drive these differences. 62 57 Indeed it is significantly so. Note that the standard error is the standard error of the average derived from a bootstrap procedure, rather than the average of the standard errors for this parameter in different sectors. 58 This implies that the standard factor share TFP estimator gives too much weight to capital. Rather than weighting capital with 1 Ϫ s L Ϫ s M it should give capital a weight of ( Rauch (1999) classifies goods as homogeneous (that is, traded on an organized exchange) reference priced; and heterogeneous; in the sample in column 4 we include sectors that produce goods in the first two groups. 60 Note that in column 5, by requiring MNE type specific ␥ in each four-digit sector, we automatically have to exclude all sectors with no or only very few observations in one of the MNE categories. We thus only include sectors with at least ten observations in each MNE category. 61 We construct this subsample by running a probit model where the left-hand-side variable is the probability of being U.S. owned, and as explanatory variables we include polynomials in labor share, material share, employment, capital, and age. A plant is then considered to be similar to a U.S. plant if its predicted probability exceeds the median predicted probability value in the sample. 62 Other unreported robustness checks include weighted regressions and regressions that control for unobserved skill levels in the firm. In terms of the latter, we include in equation (2) average wages as a proxy for the average skill level of workers; in contrast to other studies (such as Griffith & Simpson, 2001) we cannot further distinguish between operatives' and administrative employees' average wages because this information was not reported in the ARD after 1996. Notes: All regressions include a quadratic polynomial in age, age censoring dummy, and time and region dummies, not reported in the table for brevity. Column 1: robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by establishment, that is, robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. Columns 2 to 6: bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. MNE takes the value 1 if the plant is part of an MNE group. US is 1 if the MNE group is U.S. owned. Similarly for the foreign other group. In column 1 the dependent variable is log real (revenue) TFP calculated using the factor share method described in section III B. Columns 2 to 5 report the second-stage estimates of the modified version of the OP approach described in section IV B. Column 3 restricts the sample to plants in sectors where the test of constant markups could not be rejected (see appendix C). Column 4 restricts the sample to commodities sectors. Column 5 allows for different capital coefficients not only within the four-digit sector, but also across firms with different multinationality status. *significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. **significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. ***significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. Table 5 shows results from the double fixed-effects approach described in section III C. Column 1 reports estimates from the two stages on the full sample when we control separately for U.S. MNEs and other foreign effects, with dummies constructed as MNE J ever and MNE i ever . We also introduce a set of dummy variables equal to 1 if a plant was set up as a greenfield investment during our sample period by either a domestic or an MNE firm. 63 This controls for the possibility that any best firm effects-that is, the transfer of knowledge or technology from MNE parents to their plants-could be fully realized only in plants set up as greenfields rather than in takeovers. Row 1 of column 1 reports the coefficient ␤ MNE estimated in the first step. The positive but insignificant coefficient estimate of 0.007 provides only very weak support for the going global effect hypothesis in our sample. 64 Rows 2 and 3 show that the MNE advantage seems to be due to both a plant picking effect and a best firm effect. We find significant coefficient estimates of 0.066 and 0.155, respectively. Rows 4 and 5 provide evidence that the additional U.S. advantage is a consequence of plant picking rather than a best firm effect: plants that are at any time in the sample period U.S. owned have an average advantage of about 10% over all other MNE plants. Row 7 shows a significantly positive foreign non-U.S. plant effect of 4.8%, which is lower than the U.S. plant effect.
B. Explaining the U.S. Productivity Leadership
Finally, rows 8 to 11 report greenfield effects. Row 9 shows that plants that are set up by MNEs enjoy a 3.7% advantage relative to nongreenfield domestic plants, significant at the 5% level; rows 10 and 11 show that there is no additional advantage from being set up by a U.S. or a foreign MNE.
What could be a potential concern with our estimates in column 1? Firstly, the estimated multinational best firm effects coefficients are calculated as a weighted average of all observations of plants currently owned by an MNE firm minus a weighted average of observations of all plants that are not owned by an MNE firm. Thus, the MNE firm coefficient, 65 ␤ J ever , could be high for two reasons: if plants that are owned by multinationals throughout the sample period are very productive 66 or if plants that change their ownership over the course of our sample had a strong increase in productivity after being taken over by an MNE. 67 To get an idea of the timespan that MNE firms need to 63 The reference category for this set of dummy variables is the plants that were set up before our sample started so that we do not know who set them up. 64 The first row result holds in columns 1 to 3 because the various columns differ only with respect to the second-stage regression. 65 That is, in terms of the example in figure D1 in appendix D, the best firm effect is calculated as Weighted Average {2 tϩ1 , 3 t , 3 tϩ1 , 4 t , 5 t , 5 tϩ1 , 6 t , 6 tϩ1 } Ϫ Weighted Average {1 t , 1 tϩ1 , 2 t , 4 tϩ1 } where (i, t) denotes a plant-year tuple.
66 Such as 3, 5, and 6 in the example in figure D1 in appendix D. 67 Such as 2 in our example; also if plants such as 4 had a dramatic drop in productivity after being sold off. Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Row 1 (MNE) reports first-stage estimates of the ongoing global effect. Row 2 and below: coefficients and standard errors are from the second stage of our estimation procedure. The dependent variable is the fixed effects estimated in the first step. Ever MNE firm equals 1 if the plant belongs at time t to a firm that is an MNE. Ever MNE plant is 1 if the plant has ever been owned by an MNE over the course of the sample period. The same applies to the ever US and ever FOR dummies. Green dummies take the value 1 for all plants that were established during the sample period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , green UK non-MNE is 1 for plants that were owned by domestic firms when established. Green MNE is 1 for plants owned by MNE firms when established. Green US (green FOR) is 1 for plants owned by U.S. (other foreign) firms when established. Column 1 considers the whole sample of 38,501 observations. Column 2 considers only the plants that undergo a change in status over the period they are present in the sample. Column 3 considers only observations of non-MNE plants and of MNE plants when under ownership of non-MNE firms. *significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. **significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. ***significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.
increase the productivity of the acquired plants after takeover, 68 in column 2 we restrict our sample for the secondstage regression to MNE plants that had a transition from domestic to MNE over the course of our sample. 69 The MNE firm dummy reduces to less than a third relative to column 1, from 0.066 to a borderline significant 0.018. This sharp drop in the magnitude and significance of the MNE firm effect suggests that improving the productivity of acquired plants might take some time. In unreported results (available from the authors) we explored this issue in more detail and found that if we restrict the analysis to plants that we can observe for at least two years after takeover, that is, to 692 observations, the magnitude of the MNE firm dummy coefficient increases to 0.035, but is less precisely estimated with a bootstrapped standard error of 0.022. The next table presents this issue in more detail.
Secondly, the estimated MNE plant picking effects coefficients are computed as the weighted average of all observations from MNE ever plants minus a weighted average of all observations from non-MNE ever plants. 70 This plant picking effect estimate might be upward biased since the estimation includes observations from periods in which some of the cherry-picked plants were owned by an MNE ever firm. 71 Therefore, to check the robustness of the plant picking effects estimates in column 3 we restrict the second-stage regression sample to observations in the years where all plants (including those that are at some point in time owned by an MNE ever firm) are owned by non-MNE firms. 72 Similar to column 1, column 3 shows strong MNE and U.S. plant picking effects, suggesting that MNEs, and especially U.S. MNEs, choose the better plants. In contrast to column 68 In our example, a particular characteristic of plants such as 5 and 6 is that they have been owned by an MNE for longer than plants such as 2. Since we have a sample period of five years and for plants such as 2 we must observe at least one takeover, the longest time such a plant could be owned by an MNE is four years.
69 Like plant 2 in our example. 70 Note that a similar argument holds for U.S. and other foreign plant picking effects. In terms of our example, the plant picking effect is calculated as Weighted Average {2 t , 2 tϩ1 , 3 t , 3 tϩ1 , 5 t , 5 tϩ1 , 6 t , 6 tϩ1 } Ϫ Weighted Average {1 t , 1 tϩ1 , 4 t , 4 tϩ1 }. 71 In terms of the example these are (2, t ϩ 1) and (4, t) . 72 That is, we identify the plant effect from Weighted Average {(2, t)}ϪWeighted Average {(1, t), (1, t ϩ 1), (4, t ϩ 1)}. (34) . This is also the basis for the interpretation of the subsequent regression coefficients. In column 3 we consider the effect of in the previous period, as well as the influence of the average value of in all previous periods. Column 4 includes dummies to identify long-run MNE firm effects. Column 5 considers TFP growth in the selection equation.
1, we cannot find an additional plant picking effect for plants that are taken over by non-U.S. foreign firms.
Finally, a strong assumption in our identification strategy is that all unobserved heterogeneity affecting MNEs' selection of plants can be controlled for by non-time-varying fixed effects. However, it is possible that MNEs are more likely to take over plants following a temporary negative shock-which makes these plants more vulnerable to hostile takeovers but is unrelated to their long-term productivity potential (scenario 1)-or following a positive productivity shock, such as an innovation that would be indicative of better future growth potential for these plants (scenario 2).
Either of these cases can be accounted for using the extension to our structural productivity estimation framework introduced in section III C. Before discussing the results it is worth noting that only scenario 2 could undermine the conclusion that the estimated U.S. advantage over other MNEs is due to plant picking rather than firm effects. This is because in scenario 1 the double fixed-effects setup would lead to an overestimation of any firm effects. Scenario 2 on the other hand would lead to an underestimation of firm effects in the double fixed-effects case and could therefore explain why we fail to find any additional U.S. firm effects.
In table 6 we report the results from the structural model extension from section III C. We make a number of simplifying assumptions based on the results so far; but it should be noted that our framework does not depend on these assumptions. For instance, we no longer let the capital coefficient Ϫ ␥ vary across sectors. Column 1 simply replicates the OP-style regression from table 4 with constant ␥ . Our results of large MNE and larger U.S. MNE effects remain. Secondly, since in the double fixed-effects case we did not find much evidence of a going global effect, we no longer allow for this in this setting. This reduces the dimensionality of the selection model that we are adding to the structural framework. Column 2 of table 6 shows the results from allowing a selection model where only itϪ1 enters the equation determining takeover in period t. We find firstly, that any additional U.S. effect vanishes while a general MNE effect persists; secondly, rows 5 to 7 show that for all three types of MNEs the coefficients on itϪ1 from the selection equations 73 are positive and significant. Thus, MNEs select firms that were more productive in the period before takeover. Moreover, note that the selection coefficient is higher, and significantly so, as the t-value in row 12 reveals-for U.S. firms. Column 3 includes both itϪ1 and the average of before takeover itϪ1 . In this setup the coefficient on itϪ1 captures the importance solely of shortterm effects. 74 None of the short-term coefficients is significant. The long-term average coefficients are similar in size to the coefficients on itϪ1 from column 2. The values there were driven by longer-run rather than short-run effects. The long-run coefficients for U.K. and U.S. MNEs are still significant, while the coefficient for other foreign MNEs is not. 75 In column 4 we also include a dummy that takes effect the first year after the plant comes under MNE ownership; therefore a positive and significant coefficient indicates additional long-run advantages from being part of an MNE. No additional long-run advantage derives from being part of a U.S. multinational. Finally, in column 5 we include both level of itϪ1 and its lagged growth rate; this latter should capture whether changes in productivity rather than levels are driving the decision of MNE firms to take over particular plants. The growth term is never significant. In all of these cases, the key conclusion that there are no additional U.S. firm effects once selection is controlled for, holds.
V. Conclusions
This study looks at the reasons behind aggregate U.S. productivity leadership by examining the performance of U.S. MNEs in the United Kingdom relative to the performances of U.K. MNEs and other foreign MNEs. This allows us to identify to what extent U.S. productivity leadership is driven by firm-specific technological factors rather than factors that are specific to the business environment in the United States.
Compared with earlier studies, we are able to identify U.K. MNEs in such an analysis. Thus, we are able to control for the potential bias that arises because in any country MNEs are a self-selected group of top firms.
Our analysis confirms and qualifies an earlier study by Doms and Jensen (1998) using U.S. data, which ranks U.S. MNEs highest followed by other MNEs, with domestic firms ranked lowest. However, in their case it cannot be ruled out that the leadership of U.S. multinationals is simply the consequence of a home advantage. Our results suggest that this ranking is not driven by a home market advantage for U.S. firms.
In fact, we find that U.S.-owned plants have a significant productivity advantage in the United Kingdom, relative to both British MNEs and other foreign-owned plants, which show similar productivity levels and are both more productive than plants that do not invest abroad. This result is robust to imperfect competition, nonconstant returns to scale, and differences in flexible production technologies across four-digit sectors and different types of firms.
Using the dynamic variation in our data we address the concern that U.S. productivity leadership might be driven by the selection in the takeover process of superior plants, rather than by technology and knowledge transfers from MNE parent companies to their subsidiaries. We find evidence for both U.S. MNE firm effects and plant selection 73 Compare with equation (34). 74 The previous column itϪ1 in the absence of any other control captured a combination of short-and long-run effects.
75 This is likely due to problems of collinearity and the fact that we are increasingly extending how much can be separately identified from our data.
effects. However, firm effects are as strong for U.S. MNEs as for other MNE firms, but the takeovers by U.S. MNEs tend to target plants at the top of the productivity spectrum. We conclude therefore that the U.S. productivity lead found in the level regressions is driven mainly by these stronger picking effects.
There could be some concern in relation to the short time period of our sample in that if firm effects take some time to materialize they would not be detected in our study. Although we cannot exclude the possibility that if we had a longer panel we might find stronger firm effects, the fact that we actually find strong MNE firm effects occurring soon after an MNE takeover (except that they are not any stronger for U.S. firms) gives us some confidence that a longer timespan would not change the qualitative ranking.
Our results have a number of implications. Firstly, they suggest that aggregate U.S. productivity leadership might be driven by factors other than technology, that is, that other factors are driving the aggregate gap. An interesting hypothesis is that well-functioning, competitive markets in the United States 76 are more efficient at allocating larger market shares to more productive plants. Because aggregate productivity is the sum of each firm's productivity weighted by its market share, this better selection mechanism results in higher aggregate productivity. 77 Secondly, in terms of U.K. economic policy where there is a widely held view that incentives for foreign MNEs to locate in Britain are a potential instrument to increase aggregate productivity performance, our results suggest that attracting specifically U.S. FDI is unlikely to provide a quick fix for productivity problems.
Thirdly, while we cannot find any evidence that U.S. MNEs are better at transferring knowledge and technology to their subsidiaries, we did find evidence that they are better at choosing the best plants to take over. Why should U.S. firms be better than all other MNEs at selecting the best plants? There are several possible reasons. One hypothesis is that managers of U.S. MNEs pursue more aggressive takeover strategies and have specific skills that make them more successful in this activity. A second explanation is related to the particular time period considered. Indeed, in the second half of the 1990s, the U.S. stock market experienced a boom accompanied by spectacular equity price increases. During that period, the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industrial, and the NASDAQ Composite indexes more than doubled. U.S. MNEs, overvalued in the U.S. stock market, and thus with access to low-cost capital, might have found it more profitable to use this capital to target firms abroad (for example, in the United Kingdom) not affected by the same stock market bubble, rather than in the home country. 78 From our data it is not possible to thoroughly investigate these hypotheses, but this is an area of research that deserves further exploration.
• Weights are calculated using the employment register information on the basis of four-digit sector, region, and employment cells. For each cell i the weight is calculated as
Number of plants in register in cell i
Number of selected plants in cell i .
APPENDIX B
The Monotone Relationship between Profits and Shocks
Start by noting that given our assumption of a homogeneous production function (equation [3] ) we can write the cost minimization problem as
where zit represents the cost of factor z and K it ϭ . X Vit collects the same transformation for all variable production factors in a vector. Total costs become, in terms of equation (B1),
( B 2 )
Next consider the profit function.
Given the demand function (5) and the cost function (B2) we can write it as
Note that the firm's profit-maximization first-order condition is
Finally, note that the derivatives of profits with respect to it and a it are
where applying the envelope theorem the last equality follows from the first-order condition (B4) and
As a consequence of all these results we get for the total differential of profits
which establishes that there is a positive relationship between profits and the composite shock index it .
APPENDIX C
Testing whether Is Constant
In this section, we describe a simple test based on overidentifying restrictions of the hypothesis that is constant within each four-digit sector. As expected, the null hypothesis is rejected in the majority of sectors. Column 3 of table 3 shows estimates of equation (20) for a restricted sample of plants in those sectors where the null hypothesis of constant cannot be rejected to check the robustness of our results. Our test works as follows. To allow for a more general market structure we let the coefficient of capital in equation (18) 
where ␤ it K ϭ ␥ it and it ϭ ( itϪ1 ). Note that we assume that markups depend only on lagged values of it . We require this assumption for our test. One can motivate it by a certain sluggishness in price setting. To understand our next steps suppose that we had a way of observing itϪ1 but are ignorant about the shape of the markup function (⅐). To estimate equation (C1) we can approximate ␤ it K by yet another polynomial expansion in . Thus in the regression we would get interactions between k it and the polynomial terms as extra explanatory variables; for example, k it ϫ itϪ1 2 . If we assume that markups and thus ␤ K s are constant across firms on the other hand, we can use zero moment conditions between these interaction terms and the residuals as additional moment conditions-for example, E{v it ϫ k it ϫ itϪ1 2 } ϭ 0-to identify the reduced set of parameters of the constant markup model. The problem with this strategy is that is not observed. Notice however that 80 a necessary implication of these additional moment conditions is that the interaction terms are not correlated with either; for example, E{v it ϫ k it ϫ itϪ1 2 }ϭ0. Thus to examine whether these additional moment restrictions are valid we need estimates of v it and itϪ1 . We described above how we can derive those.
APPENDIX D
Identification of Double Fixed Effects
Suppose our sample consists of six plants 81 that are owned by three different firms (A, B, and C). We observe them for two periods, t and t ϩ 1. In period t firms A and B are domestic, while firm C is an MNE. In period t ϩ 1 firm B starts investing abroad and thus becomes an MNE whereas A remains domestic. 82 Moreover, we have the following takeover events: plant 2 is acquired by firm C and plant 4 is sold off to firm A by firm B before it starts investing abroad. 83 How can we differentiate between the MNE effects discussed in the paper with the variation in this example? Consider first the plant picking effect. The plant in the example that was taken over by an MNE is plant 2. If we found that in year t plant 2 had a higher productivity than plant 1 this would be evidence of a plant picking effect. To examine the existence of best firm effects we can compare the productivity of plant 2 in year t ϩ 1 relative to year t. If its productivity increases after it is taken over by firm C this would be evidence of a best firm effect. 84 Finally, for the going global effect we need to look at firm B and examine whether the productivity of its plant 3 increases from t to t ϩ 1.
In our sample, how many changes between multinational status for firms and between different types of firms for plants do we observe? Table  D1 reports the occurrence of all these changes in our data set. The upper panel reports the number of status changes for each possible transition between U.K. non-MNEs U.K. MNEs, U.S. MNEs, and non-U.S. foreign MNEs (FOR). For example the cell in row 1, column 2, reports that in our sample there are 589 transitions from U.K. non-MNEs to U.K. MNEs. The lower panel reports only the number of status changes that also involve an ownership change. Therefore, the cell in row 5, column 2, reports that 255 of the 589 British plants that became multinational did so by means of an ownership change, that is, a takeover. This implies that the remaining 334 plants became part of a British MNE because the firm they belonged to started investing abroad. This is the variation we use to identify ␤ MNE . In total, the upper panel shows that we have 1,118 changes between non-MNE and MNE status. 85 The lower panel shows that 784 of these changes involved a change in ownership, that is, a takeover. Overall, the upper panel of table D1 shows that about 10% of all the transition events we observe in the data involve a change in multinational status. 86 From the lower panel we can derive that about 40% of all ownership changes in our sample involve changes between multinational status. 87 Thus, while the majority of plants do not change status, in the data there is still some nonnegligible number of status changes. 79 For simplicity we make the formal argument in terms of log levels and not deviations from log values of the median plant as in section III B. A similar argument can be made in both cases. 80 Unless demand shocks it and technical TFP shocks a it are perfectly negatively correlated.
81 Numbered 1 to 6 in figure 2. 82 In terms of our earlier dummies we would thus have MNE A ever ϭ 0, MNE B ever ϭ 1 (in both year t and t ϩ 1), and MNE C ever ϭ 1. 83 Consequently MNE 1 ever ϭ 0 and MNE 4 ever ϭ 0 whereas for all other plants MNE i ever ϭ 1 @i ϭ 2, 3, 5, 6.
